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The Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition in Missouri
(Concluded)
6.
THE WRIT ALSO ISSUES TO STOP A COURT FROM EXCEEDING ITS JURISDICTION IN .4 CAUSE OF
WHICH IT HAS 7URISDICTION
The distinction has often been made between instances where the
court has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the pending case and instances
where the court has jurisdiction over the pending case, but is about to do
some act, in the course of the trial, that it has no power to do. There is
a distinction between nojurisdiction and an act in excess ofjurisdiction.
In either situation prohibition will issue. It may be said the writ of prohibition is used for the same purpose when it is employed to stop judicial
action when no jurisdiction over the pending matter exists and where it
is employed to stop an act in excess of the jurisdiction of the court.
The great purpose of the writ is to prevent usurpation of judicial power.
It is obvious though a court may have power to do some things in a
pending case, it is wholly without power to do others. If the action about
to be taken is beyond its powers prohibition will issue to stop it from
being taken. The distinction referred to is thus made by Lamm, J., in
Bernero v. Mc.uillan:138 "The unbending test to be applied to determine
whether a writ of prohibition should issue in a given case, is this: has the
court, complained ofjurisdiction to do what it is about to do? It matters
little whether it is in fault in proceeding without any jurisdiction at all,
or (as put in some cases) in excess of its jurisdiction, the writ will go in
either event. So, in a given case, though the court has general jurisdiction of that class of cases, if it is about to do in that case some particular important thing which it has no judicial power to do, the writ
has been allowed."
The distinction has been put as follows by Kennish, J., in State ex
rel. TerminalRy. Co. v. Tracy:1 9 "The first two grounds thus stated are
recognized as settled law in the adjudged cases, and if the facts of a
given case show either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, together
with an absence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity, a case is made
warranting the issuance of the writ. It should be observed that, although
want of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are commonly referred to
and considered as separate grounds for the issuance of the writ, there is
in principle little distinction between them, as each means an attempt
138.
139.

(1912) 246 Mo. 517,1. c. 532, 152 S. W. 347.
(1911) 140 S. W. 888,1. c. 8o, 237 Mo. 109,1. c. 118.
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by a court or person to take judicial action without judicial power or

authority for such action."
The distinction between utter lack ofjurisdiction and excess ofjurisdiction is much easier to make than the distinction between excess of
jurisdiction and error in the exercise of jurisdiction. What is error only?
What is an excess of jurisdiction? These questions are of the utmost importance. If error only is about to be committed, prohibition will not
issue. Perhaps here again, the best way to determine what is excess of
jurisdiction is to examine the decisions and classify them.
For example the writ was issued by the Supreme Court of Missouri
stopping further action by the circuit court in a cause appealed from the
probate court to the circuit court, where the latter court, though it
affirmed the probate court, attempted to enforce the judgment by contempt proceedings, instead of certifying a transcript of the record back
140
to the probate court for the probate court to enforce the judgment
as the law required. The circuit court had no power to make such an
order though it had appellate jurisdiction.
A writ of prohibition was issued to the St. Louis Court of Criminal
Correction stopping the latter court from proceeding further in a habeas
corpus case because that court had no power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus when the judges of the criminal court of St. Louis were present
in the city. 141 It appeared that the judges of the criminal court were not
absent, hence, though under some circumstances the court in question
had power to i'ssue writs of habeas corpus, it was exceeding its power in
the particular case as the judges of the other court were present. Perhaps it may be said that this in reality is a case where there was no jurisdiction at all. Certainly the lower court in entertaining jurisdiction,
after it was learned a judge of the other court was in the city, had no
power to go on with the habeas corpus matter. So, an order of a circuit
court, in an equity case, for an accounting, was held to be in excess of its
jurisdiction and beyond its power, when it was made upon a foreign corporation whose books, home office, funds, and policy holders were in
140. State ex rel. Baker v.Bird (1913) 253 Mo. 569, 162 S. W. 119. The granting
of the writ was also placed on other grounds. The action of the circuit court in citing
relator for contempt was also in excess of the jurisdiction as it was taken after an
appeal to the supreme court.
141. State ex rel. Walker v. Murphy (1895) 132 Mo. 382, 33 S. W. 36. Gantt,
P. J., writing the opinion, said: "The position of defendant that he had the right to
proceed and determine the application for habeas corpus unless the applicantdisclosed
that he was held in custody under a criminal charge cannot be maintained. The
moment he was apprised that the prisoner was held in custody under an indictment
for murder, and that either of the judges of the criminal court was in the city, it
was his duty to decline all further cognizance of the case, for it then became apparent
that the application should have been first made to one of the judges of the criminal
court, and from that time defendant was exceeding his jurisdiction."
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other states. 42 A circuit court was stopped from proceeding further in
a disbarment proceeding, when it was based upon a charge of embezzlement, and when the attorney had appealed to the Supreme Court of
Missouri from ajudgment of conviction in a circuit court, and the appeal
was then pending.1 41 It was held that pending the appeal no action could
be taken in the disbarment matter and that the action about to be taken
was in excess of its jurisdiction, "something that it had no power to do
in the given case". An interesting question, as to what is excess of jurisdiction, arose in a condemnation proceeding. A circuit court, in a proceeding to condemn land for a school building, directed the commissioner
appointed to assess damages, not to allow any compensation to the owner,
due to the fact that the property was a part of an addition which was
restricted in its use for residence purposes.144 It was held that the circuit court's direction was in excess of its jurisdiction, an order he had no
power to make. From these decisions it would seem that if the order or
ruling of the lower court is one that it has no power to make in any
cause of the class to which the pending case belongs, it is an act in excess
of the court's jurisdiction, which may be prevented by the writ of prohibition. It is obvious that not every erroneous order is an order the
court has no power to make, hence an excess of its jurisdiction. Inferior
courts of general jurisdiction and of limited jurisdiction, possess a wide
142. State ex rel. Minnesota Ins. Co. v. Denton (1910) 229 Mo. 187, 1.c. 196,
129 S. W. 709. Valliant, J., writing the opinion, said: "In this case before the balance,
if any, that is due the plaintiff could be ascertained, there must be a complete visitation of the corporation, a thorough inquiring into all of its affairs and an ascertainment not only of the condition of the account of the corporation with this plaintiff,
but of the accounts of all its members who now have, or have ever had, policies on the
assessment plan, no matter how numerous they may be, or through how many states
they may be scattered, because this is a mutual concern and the accounts of all are
involved in the account of one. Such an accounting is not beyond the jurisdiction
of a court of equity that may have full jurisdiction of the corporation, but is beyond
the jurisdiction of a court of equity that has only the limited or qualified jurisdiction
over a foreign insurance corporation that is given by our laws to our courts."
There were other grounds for issuing the writ.
143. State ex rel. Larew v. Sale (1905) 188 Mo. 493, 87 S. W. 967. Valliant, J.,
used this language: "On the other hand, whilst the main office of the writ is to keep
the court to which it is addressed within the bounds of its jurisdiction, yet, in the
exercise of the discretion above referred to, the writ is sometimes used to keep a
court from doing what it has no lawful authority to do in a case the general nature of
which is within its jurisdiction. This court in reference to an order of a circuit court
made in a contested election case per Barclay, J., said: 'If the court had no lawful
authority to make it, that is to say, if the order was beyond the power of the court in
the pending election contest, the writ of prohibition would undoubtedly lie, notwithstanding the court might have general jurisdiction over election contests, and hence
over the subject matter of the proceeding. For it is settled law that prohibition may
be used (upon a proper showing) to keep a court within the limits of its lawful authority in a given case, no less than to prevent cognizance of causes not committed by law
to its jurisdiction.' (State ex rel. v. Slover, 126 Mo. 652, 1. c. 655)."
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range of judicial power. They have power to pass upon the question in
the first instance, including the power to rule erroneously. In the field
where power is given the lower court to apply the law, errors which are
about to be committed in making rulings cannot be prevented by prohibition. It may truly be said that inferior courts have the power, in
the first instance, to rule erroneously, if the ruling is of the general kind
which the court may make in cases of that class.
What is meant is well illustrated by the quotation in the note to
Pelers el al. v. Buckner.' 4 A court of general jurisdiction does not exceed
its powers in giving an erroneous instruction in the trial of a cause, of
which it has jurisdiction; but, in a condemnation proceeding no court
has the power to direct the commissioner, authorized to assess damages,
not to allow compensation for valuable easements taken, or, for part of
the land taken, since the confirmation of the report and payment of the
sum assessed deprives the owner of his private property rights. Perhaps
the consideration of the question may now be best advanced by attempting to group the cases in which it has been determined that the proposed
144. Peters et al. v. Buckner (1921) (Mo.) 232 S. W. 1024, 288 Mo.. 618. The
following analysis of the question is taken from a concurring opinion of Graves, J.,
concurred in by James T. Blair, C. J., Walker, and David E. Blair, J. J., I. c. 1030:
"It is urged that Judge Buckner has, at most, only erred in instructing the commissioners appointed by him to assess damages, and that mere matters of error cannot be
reached by prohibition or mandamus. This we think is true. But the instruction
given to commissioners for the assessment of damages in condemnation proceedings
are not on the plane of mere instructions in the trial of a lawsuit. They could not be,
if we keep in mind the Constitution. This branch of the proceeding is not the trial of
the case, but it only furnishes the basis for the ultimate trial, should the parties feel
aggrieved at the action of the commissioners, which commission is the arm of the
court. Suppose I owned 40 acres of land which was wanted for public purpose.
Suppose further the petition shows such ownership to be in me, and the circuit
judge said to his commissioners (the arms of the court), 'You go out and see what you
think Graves has been damaged by taking the east 20 acres but you must not allow
him anything for the taking of the west 20 acres, although it is just as valuable.' Is
such action mere error, or is it an excess of power under the Constitution, which says
that Graves is entitled to have the cash for his land before it is taken? We think the
latter. Such court would be going beyond the limits of his power in directing his
commission to take half of the land without compensation. It is a new and intricate
matter, and must be determined upon the common sense of the situation. Take the
instant case. If the report of the commission is approved, and the money paid into
court, then the schoolhouse can be built, the easement absolutely destroyed, and no
payment into court for the damages done; in other words, the petition in the case
before Judge Buckner shows that Peters has a valuable easement, and the approval
of a report made under this unconstitutional direction takes the property without the
deposit of the damages or the payment of damages. Judge Buckner is in fact and in
law proceeding to take private property for public use without even permitting a consideration of damages. This is in excess of the power of any Missouri court under our
Constitution. Whilst the question is a new one, I feel that there is more than mere
error involved. I feel that the act of the court in directing (its arm) the commissioners
to take private property for public use without first paying therefor is an act in
excess of jurisdiction rather than mere error."
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action is in excess of the court's power rather than erroneous exercise
of the court's power.
(a) MATTERS OF TRIAL PRACTICE
There are quite a number of cases where important matters of trial
practice have become the subject of sharp controversy, and one of the
litigants, to prevent a ruling about to be made, has petitioned a higher
court for a writ of prohibition, on the ground that the lower court proposes to exceed its jurisdiction. Prohibition, for instance, has issued by
the Supreme Court of Missouri to a circuit court, stopping it from disregarding the provisions of a special jury law. The trial court, acting
under a rule of its own, was about to use a jury drawn by merely taking
forty names from the wheel which contained the names of persons that
had already been selected by the jury commissioner for jury service.
The law relating to special juries provided that the special jury should
be selected by the commissioner, not from the number already selected,
but required a selection by him in each case from the inhabitants of the
city qualified for jury service. It was held that the rule of that court
was beyond its power, in violation of the statute, and hence it was about
to exceed its jurisdiction.'
It has been held by a court of appeals that
prohibition will lie to prevent a justice of the peace, in an unlawful detainer action, from awarding a jury trial over the protest of plain1
tiff.
46 He had no more power, it was held, to call in a jury than he had to
delegate his decision to a single private individual. So, also a court of ap145. State ex rel. Railway Co. v. Withrow (1896) 133 Mo. 500, 34 S. W. 245, 36
S. W. 43. The opinion of the court by Sherwood, J., is largely devoted to a discussion
of the meaning and constitutionality of the special jury law. As to the propriety of
prohibition he said: "But one point remains to be considered, and that the method of*
relief resorted to by relators; as to which it is well settled law that such manner of
redress as is prayed for by relators may be granted when the action of the lower court
exhibits evidences of excess of jurisdiction, as well as when exhibiting absolutely
absence of jurisdiction. Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 1. c. 541; Jac. Law Dict. tit. Prohibition; Ward v. Kelsey, 14 Abb. Pr. 106; State v. Ridgell, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 569;
People ex rel. v. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 81; People ex rel. v. Whitney, Ibid. 584; 2
Spelling, Extra. Rel., sec. 1726, and cases cited; I Ibid., sec. 626."
146. State ex rel. Kansas City, etc. v. Allen (1891) 45 Mo. App. 551. Ellison, J., writing the opinion, said: "If the statute gives the relator the right which he
asserts, and imposes upon the justice of the peace the duty to try the cause, he does
not merely erroneously decide a question over which he has jurisdiction. He does not
merely commit an error in the proceedings, but he absolutely abdicates his official
functions. He has no voice or control of the result. The verdict of the jury would be
absolute and beyond his control. If no jury is authorized by the law he could not
more effectually exceed his powers in the cause (notwithstanding he may have jurisdiction of such cause) than if he should direct the issues to be tried before some individual, with the intention of rendering judgment on the decision of such individual."
See Delaney u. Police Court (1902) 167 Mo. 667, 67 S. W. 589, for a dictum that
denial of a jury trial in a police court is error only. The court held that petitioner for
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peal has held that a justice of the peace should be stopped by a writ of
prohibition from instructing a jury in writing when the pending action
was a suit on a promissory note. 4 So it has been held by the Supreme
Court of Missouri that a circuit court will be stopped by prohibition from
proceeding further in a contempt order issued against a litigant who had
refused to produce books and papers in connection with his examination
before a special commissioner appointed to take depositions. It was held
that the applicable statute did not confer upon the court power to compel the production of books, etc., before a special commissioner.' 48 A
writ was issued preventing a circuit court from carrying out an order to
compel a referee, that the court had duly appointed, to report when
the referee had previously resigned because of admitted prejudice on his
part against one of the parties to a pending suit. It was held the referee
had the right to resign because of prejudice and hence the circuit court
lacked power to compel him to go on with his duties.149 The writ was
issued to a circuit court in a trust estate matter pending there, stopping
the court from appointing auditors to advise the court as to needed
changes in business methods, etc., where the management of the
property was vested in the trustees by the creator of the trust. Such an
order was held to be beyond the power of the court."' The writ was
issued preventing a circuit court from retaining control over a trust
estate where the parties came into the court for the sole purpose of
having the court appoint new trustees."'
prohibition was not entitled to a jury trial. Marshall, J., delivering the opinion, said:
"Even if all the plaintiff contends for be conceded, it would amount only to error,
which could only be corrected by appeal. The jurisdiction of the police court to try
cases for violation of municipal police regulations, leveled at disorderly conduct and
drunkenness on the streets, is exclusive. Its procedure in the exercise of its jurisdiction
may or may not be erroneous, but so long as it has jurisdiction, and acts within its
jurisdiction, its rulings and proceedings cannot be reviewed or corrected by means of
a writ of prohibition, no matter how erroneous such rulings and proceedings may be."
This is a very liberal view of the powers of a police court. The view that denial
of ajury trial, by a court of limited jurisdiction, like a police court, is an act in excess
of its jurisdiction, seems preferable.
147. State ex rel. Schonhorst v. Cline (1900) 85 Mo. App. 628. Biggs, J., writing
the opinion, said: "This was not mere error or irregularity, but a sheer usurpation of a
jurisdiction not conferred upon him by law. To restrain the exercise of an excess of
jurisdiction, prohibition will lie."
148. State ex rel. Stroh v. Klene (1918) 276 Mo. 206, 207 S. W. 496.
149. State ex rel. Wright v. Mc9uillin (1913) 252 Mo. 334, 158 S. W. 652.
150. State ex rel. Higgins v. Rusk (1911) 236 Mo. 201, 139 S. W. 199.
151. State ex rel. McManusv. Muench (1908) 217 Mo. 124, 117 S. W. 25. Lamm,
J., writing the opinion said, "Those issues we have stated. Briefly, they are the
appointment of a new trustee and putting that trustee in the shoes of the old one
(i. e. vesting him with the title to the real estate devised in trust by the grandmother's
will.) Such being the simple, sharp and on!y issues, the decree invoked thereby should
have contented itself with deciding them, and, having set them at rest by the appointment of a new trustee and providing for his bond, and having invested him with
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Prohibition will be granted when a court of equity, disregarding a
statute awards a temporary injunction without requiring a bond. 52' So
the writ issued to stop a circuit court from quashing a notice to take
depositions when the case was rightfully transferred from one division of
the court to another when a valid notice had been given while the cause
was pending in the first division.'53 The writ was issued stopping a circuit court from enforcing an order made upon the court's own initiation
ordering public accountants to make an audit of a corporation's books
in a receivership matter. The court held no such power existed in an
54
equity court.
(b) S UBPOENA D UCES TECUM
The writ will also issue when a court issues a subpoena duces lecum
that is beyond the power of the court. Hence the writ was issued stopping a circuit court from enforcing obedience to subpoena duces tecum
which was beyond its power, in that it required members of a board of
election commissioners to violate the secrecy of the ballot as protected by
title, the power of the court in the subject matter of that particular suit was exhausted
and at end. This certainly is so unless we adopt the heresy that a court, sua sponte,
may hold a trust estate in its grasp for all purposes of administration under some
droll notion that once in chancery for any purpose whatsoever a trust estate is always in chancery for all purposes whatsoever."
See State ex rel. Ponath v.Muench (1910) 230 Mo. 236, 130 S. W. 282.
152. State ex rel. Railway Co. v. Williams (1909) 221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W. 740.
Gantt, J.,writing the opinion, used the following instructive language: "In view of
the reason of the statute exacting a bond as a condition precedent to the granting of an
injunction, we are of the opinion that the requirement of it goes to the very jurisdiction of the court and that an injunction under the statute without requiring the bond
and its execution and approval before the issuing of the injunction, is and would be
in excess of the jurisdiction of the circuit court; that, notwithstanding its general
equity powers, the statute must control and be held to modify and regulate its
jurisdiction, and when the consequences to a defendant are considered, the statute is a
wise and salutary one and should be enforced. On this point our opinion is that the
respondent in issuing his restraining order and refusing to discontinue, set aside or
annul it, exceeded his jurisdiction and should be prohibited from further maintaining
said temporary injunction and ordered to set aside the same."
153. State ex rel. Wilson v. Burney (1915) 193 Mo. App. 327, 186 S. W. 23.
Johnson, J., thus defined an act in excess of jurisdiction. "But a judicial act will be
treated as extra jurisdictional when it takes on the form and character of an abuse of
judicial power in an action and concerning a subject-matter belonging to a class over
which the respondent court had jurisdiction."
See also State ex rel. Methudy v.Killoren (1921) (Mo. App.) 229 S.W. 1097, when
a circuit court was stopped from entertaining jurisdiction of a bill in equity to restrain a litigant from taking depositions where the bill was based upon the ground
that the petition in the suit in which the depositions were to be taken did not state a
cause of action. It was held that depositions could be taken in any pending suit and
hence a court of equity had no power to enjoin a litigant from taking them.
154. State ex rel. Buckingham, etc. Co. v. Kimmel (1916) (Mo. App.) 183 S. W.
651.
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the statutes. l5 The writ has been issued preventing a circuit judge from
carrying out an order requiring a stranger to a pending suit to produce
books, etc., when the subpoena in no manner disclosed how the books,
etc., were relevant to the suit. 156
(c) ORDERS IN

ELECTION CONTESTS

The writ will also issue to prevent an inferior court from enforcing
an order in an election contest which is beyond its powers and will result
in destroying the secrecy of the ballot as prote'cted by the constitution
15 7
or the statutes made pursuant thereto.
(d) AB USE OF POWER BY CO URTS OF EQUITY
Though courts of equity have broad powers as to injunctions and
receivers yet there is a limit beyond which they have no power. Hence
prohibition has been issued stopping a circuit court from continuing a
temporary receiver appointed without notice and in vacation, when the
temporary receiver was to continue for as long a period as three months.
158 Also a circuit court was stopped from enforcing a temporary injunc155. State ex rel. Feinstein v. Hartmann (Mo.) (1921) 231 S. W. 982. James T.
Blair, J., writing the opinion, said: "The language of the provison is plain and unambiguous. The language of the subpoena is no less so. That the command of the
subpoena is violative of the prohibition of the statute seems to us to be so clear as to
be indisputable. In view of this express prohibition we hold the court had no authority to enforce the subpoena it issued." See State ex rel. Monett U. Thurman (1916)
268 Mo. 537, 187 S. W. 1190 and State ex rel. Von Stade v. Taylor (1909) 220 Mo. 618,
119 S. W. 373.
156. State ex rel. Ozark, etc. Co. v. Wurdeman (1913) 176 Mo. App. 540, 158
S. W. 436. Nortoni, J., writing the opinion said: 1. c. 546: "The petition for the
subpoena duces tecum is obviously insufficient and it appears that the court declined
to quash it on a motion to do so. Moreover, from respondent's return, it appears that
no evidence was introduced at the hearing of the motion to quash the subpoena revealing a state of facts from which the court could determine the relevancy and
materiality of the evidence sought to be thus brought into court. This being true,
any subsequent proceeding to enforce obedience to the subpoena duces tecum would,
of course, exceed the power of the court in that behalf, and prohibition will lie."
It is questionable whether there was an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction
rather than mere error.
157. State ex rel. McCurdy v. Slover (1894) 126 Mo. 652, 29 S. W. 718; State ex
rel. Young v. Oliver (1901) 163 Mo. 679, 64 S. W. 128; State ex rel. Funkhouser v.
Spencer (1901) 166 Mo. 271, 65 S. W. 981.
158. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Wear (1896) 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357, 658.
Barclay, J., writing the opinion, said: "No court in Missouri may, without notice, declare a receivership (pending suit) for a longer time than is fairly and reasonably
requisite to allow the defendant, whose possession is invaded, to show cause against a
further continuance of the receivership. What is such reasonable time will depend on
the circumstances of each case. But we have no doubt that three months is beyond
(and very far beyond) any reasonable day for the showing of cause."
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tion issued without notice on the last day of the term (August 31), the
59
court immediately adjourning to October.
7.
LOWER CO URT DETERMINES FACTS UPON WHICH ITS
JURISDICTION DEPENDS
Whether the claim is that the lower court has no jurisdiction whatsoever or that the lower court is about to do something in excess of its
jurisdiction, in a case where it has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject to the action, the rule is clearly fixed that if there exists a dispute as to the facts, the lower court has power to determine the facts.
A superior court will not consider conflicting evidence and decide the
jurisdictional facts and then issue or withhold the writ accordingly.'
The power to decide what are facts, upon conflicting evidence, is in the
lower court. The rule as to this phase of our subject has been well stated
as follows by Graves, J., in Stale ex rel. Johnston v. Caulfield,1' a case
where the Supreme Court of Missouri issued its writ of prohibition to
a court of appeals stopping the latter court from going further with a
preliminary writ of prohibition that it had issued to a pr6bate court:
"The information on file in Judge Shackleford's court charged that
the alleged insane person was within the jurisdiction of his court.
Whether he was in such jurisdiction was a question of fact to be determined by the probate court upon a proper hearing. Prohibition will not
lie to stop the judge of probate from determining the question of fact
as to his jurisdiction. By their writ respondents are seeking to do this,
and in so doing are exceeding their authority and powers."
159. State ex rtI. Caron v. Dearing (1921) 291 Mo. 169, 236 S. W. 629. David E.
Blair, J., writing the opinion, used this language: "We have been cited by relators
to no cases where the granting of a temporary injunction has been stayed or prevented
by our writ of prohibition as an excess of jurisdiction; but in a number of cases this
court has announced the rule that notice should be required before the granting of
such injunction unless there exists a crying need for immediate action by injunction,
and that the granting of injunctions in cases where notice is required amounted to an
excessive exercise of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the conclusion is irresistible that the proceedings on the second application without such notice amounted
to snap judgment against defendants, and were arbitrary and wrongful, were not had
in the exercise of respondent's sound discretion, and constituted an excessive exercise
of his usual and rightful jurisdiction as judge of said circuit court; that relators have
no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise save and except by our intervention."
160. State ex rel. American, etc. Co. v. Shields (1911) (Mo.) 141 S. W. 585.
State ex rel. Crouse v. Mills (1910) 231 Mo. 493, 133 S. W. 22; State ex rel. Johnston v.
Caulbeld (1912) 245 Mo. 676, 150 S. W. 1047; Coleman v. Dalton (1897) 71 Mo. App.
14; State ex ret. v. Seay (1886) 23 Mo. App. 623.
161. (1912) 245 Mo. 676, 150 S. W. 1047.
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8.
ISS UANCE OF THE WRIT IS DISCRETIONARY
Again it may be said that whether the writ is prayed for to stop a
lower court from exceeding its powers or from acting where it has no
power at all, the prevailing view is that the issuance or withholding of
the writ is a matter of sound judicial discretion.'62 It is not generally
regarded as a writ of right. The rule was thus tersely stated by Valliant,
63
J., in State ex rel. Larew v. Sale:"
"And it is not every case in which the court erroneously decides
that it has jurisdiction that calls for a writ of prohibition. The writ of
prohibition, in spite of the frequent use to which it has in late years
been put, is still an extraordinary writ and issues only when sound judiccial discretion commends it; in that view it is not a writ of right."
This also is the same view that obtained in the English common
law,' at least where the lack ofjurisdiction was not patent on the record
below. The Missouri cases have not emphasized a distinction between
cases where the want of jurisdiction below is patent and is not patent.
162. Thomas v. Mead (1865) 36 Mo. 232; State ex rel. Ry. Co. v. Seay (1886)
23 Mo. App. 623; State ex rel. Webster v. Johnson (1896) 132 Mo. 105, 33 S. W. 781;
Pulliam
State ex rel. McCafferty v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494; State ex rel.
v. Fort (1904) 107 Mo. App. 328, 81 S. W. 476; Willow Springs Co. v. Mountain
Grove, etc. Co. (1917) (Mo. App.) 197 S. W. 916.
In State ex rel. Ellis v. Elkin (1895) 130 Mo. 90, 30 S. W. 333, 31 S. W. 1037,
Barclay, J., states the rule as follows: "The granting of a prohibitory writ is discretionary in the sense that the court will not issue it, unless the facts exhibited appear
to justify a resort to such a remedy. Where other convenient and effective modes of
reaching the same result are open to the complaining party, the court may decline to
award the extraordinary remedy. But it is not bound to decline because there may be
some concurrent remedy. Whether other modes of relief are equally effective is a
question to be determined in each particular exigency.
"And where a state of facts is presented, calling for the use of the writ according
to the principles and usages of law, and where no other remedy is available, its allowance is not discretionary, but a matter of right under our constitution. (Art. 2, sec.

10.)"
163. (1905) 188 Mo. 496, 87 S. W. 976.
164. People ex rel. Adams v. Westbrook (1882) 89 N. Y. 152; Farquarson.v.
Morgan (1894) 1 Q. B. Div. 552; 8 Bacon's Abridgment, 209; High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., 709; 10 Laws of England, by Halsbury, pp. 141 and 147;
Smith v. Whitney (1886) 116 U. S. 167; In re Cooper (1891) 143 U. S. 472; In re
Huguley Mfg. Co. (1901) 184 U. S. 297.
The rule is thus stated by Bacon (Vol. 8, p. 209): "It is laid down in Hob. that
though a surmise be a matter of fact, and triable by a jury, yet it is in the discretion
of the court to deny a prohibition, when it appears to them that the surmise is not
true.
"Hob. 67 in the case of Aston Parish v. Castle Birmidge Chapel. This authority
has been often quoted in questions of this kind, and in some cases denied to be law.
But yet it seems the better opinion, and to have been so holden by the greater number
of our judges, that the awarding of a prohibition is a matter discretionary, that is,
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9.
PROHIBITION DOES NOT ISSUE TO PREVENT OR CORRECT ERROR
There seems to be little doubt that the rule in Missouri is that prohibition will not issue by a superior court to correct error or to prevent
that from the circumstances of the case the superior courts are at liberty to exercise
a legal discretion herein, but not an abritrary one, in refusing prohibitions, where in
such like cases they have been granted, or where by the laws and statutes of the realm
they ought to be granted."
In Farquarsonv. Morgan (1894) 1 Q. B. Div. 552, supra, the rule was thus stated
by Lopes, L. J.: "The result of the authorities appears to be thus: that the granting
of a prohibition is not an absolute right in every case where an inferior tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction, and that, where the absence or excess of jurisdiction is not
apparent upon the face of the proceedings, it is discretionary with the court to decide whether the party applying has not by laches or misconduct lost his right to the
writ to which, under other circumstances, he would be entitled. The reason why,
notwithstanding such acquiescence, a prohibition is granted where the want of jurisdiction is apparent on the fact of the proceedings, is explained by Lord Denham in
Bodenham v. Ricketts, supra, to be for the sake of the public, lest 'the case might become a precedent if allowed to stand without impeachment,' and I would add for
myself, because it is a want of jurisdiction of which the court is informed by the proceedings before it, and which the judge should have observed, and of which he
should himself have taken notice."
In Smith v. Whitney (1886) 116 U. S. 167, supra, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that it had appelate jurdisiction of a judgment of the Supreme
Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a petition for a writ of prohibition.
Discussing the nature of the writ, Mr. Justice Gray said: "It is often said that the
granting or refusing of a writ of prohibition is discretionary, and therefore not the
subject of a writ of error. That may be true, where there is another legal remedy
by appeal or otherwise, or where the question of the jurisdiction of the court whose
action is sought to be prohibited is doubtful, or depends on facts which are not made
matter of record, or where a stranger, as he may in England, applies for the writ of
prohibition. But where the court has clearly no jurisdiction of the suit or prosecution
instituted before it, and the defendant therein has objected to its jurisdiction at the
outset, and has no other remedy, he is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of
right; and a refusal to grant it, where all the proceedings appear of record, may be reviewed on error. This is the clear result of the modern English decisions, in which the
law concerning writs of prohibition has been more fully discussed and explained than
in older authorities."
The following statement of the rule was made by Chief Justice Fuller in In
re Cooper (1891) 143 U. S. 472: "But it is clear upon reason and authority that
where the case has gone to sentence and the want of jurisdiction does not appear
upon the face of the proceedings, the granting of the writ, which even if of right is not
of course, is not obligatory upon the court, and the party applying may be precluded
by acquiescence from obtaining it."
The latter stated the rule as follows in In re Huguley (1901) 184 U. S. 297: "It
is firmly established that where it appears that a court, whose action is sought to be
prohibited, has clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, a party who has objected
to the jurisdiction at the outset and has no other remedy, is entitled to a writ of
prohibition as a matter of right. But where there is another legal remedy by appeal
or otherwise, or where the question of the jurisdiction of the court is doubtful, or
depends on facts which are not made matter of record, the granting or refusal of the
writ is discretionary. In re Rice, 155 U. S.396."
See also 26 Harvard Law Review 378; 36 Harvard Law Review 863.
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error. This statement, in substance, is found in a great many opinions.'
It appears in the very earliest case' 67 and in the latest cases' 68 on-the
purpose and scope of the writ. There is no compact a'nd simple definition
of error that when read and applied to the problem at hand will surely
disclose whether the proposed action of the lower court is error only or
excess of jurisdiction. To determine whether the proposed action is
error, one must apply the applicable rule of substantive law and procedure. One must know the powers of the courts under the common law
system as modified by the constitution and statutes of the state. In the
first prohibition case, which was decided by the Missouri Supreme Court,
Morris v. Lenox, 169 the court revised the judgment of a circuit court,
that had issued prohibition to a justice court, on the ground that the
justice at most had committed error only. The facts and rulings in that
case have already been considered in the "Introduction" to this article.
As previously stated, the opinion is brief and little light is furnished on
the question of what is error as distinguished from excess of jurisdiction.
The opinion leaves no doubt, however, that prohibition will not issue to
prevent or correct error only. What is error, and hence not reached by
prohibition, was stated as follows by Kennish, J., in Siate ex rel. Graham
v. Seehorn:'7 '
166. Morris v. Lenox and Martin (1843) 8 Mo. 253; Werthheimer v. Mayor of
Boonville, et al. (1860) 29 Mo. 254; Thomas v. Mead (1865) 36 Mo. 232; Wilson v.
Berkstresser (1870) 45 Mo. 283; Bowman's Case (1877) 67 Mo. 146; State ex el.
Mason v. Laughlin (1879) 7 Mo. App. 529 ;State ex rel. The Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
v. Seay, Judge, et al. (1886) 23 Mo. App. 623; State ex rel. Mermod 0. Heege (1880)
39 Mo. App. 49; State ex rel. Union Depot Rd. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1889) 100 Mo.
59, 13 S. W. 398; State ex rel. Johnson v. Withrow (1891) 108 Mo. 1, 18 S. W. 41;
State ex rel. Webster v. Johnson (1896) 132 Mo. 105, 33 S. W. 781; Shaw v. Pollard
(1900) 84 Mo. App. 286; Wand v. Ryan, Judge, et aL (1902) 166 Mo. 646, 65 S. W.
1025; Delaney v. Police Court (1902) 167 Mo. 667, 67 S. W. 589; Eckerle v. Wood, et al.
(1902) 95 Mo. App. 378, 69 S. W. 45; State exrel. Hagermanv. Taylor, etal. (1906) 193
Mo. 654, 91 S. W. 917; State ex rel. McNamee v. Stobie, et al. (1906) 194 Mo. 14, 92
S. W. 191; State ex rel. Meador v. Williams, et al. (1906) 117 Mo. App. 564, 92 S. W.
151; State ex rel. Sale v. McElhinney (1906) 199 Mo. 67, 97 S. W. 159; State ex rel.
Kochtitzky v. Riley (1907) 203 Mo. 175, 101 S. W. 567; State ex rel. Kansas City v.
Lucas (1911) 236 Mo. 18, 139 S. W. 348; Stateexrel. Terminal,etc. Ry. v. Tracy (1911)
(Mo.) 140 S. W. 888; State ex rel. Graham v. Seehorn (1912) 246 Mo. 541, 151 S. W.
716; State ex rel. Warde v. Mc.uillan (1914) 262 Mo. 256; 171 S. W. 72; State ex rel.
Keirsey u. Calvird (1917) 195 Mo. App. 354, 191 S. W. 1079; State ex rel. Buckner v.
Ellison (1919) 277 Mo. 294, 210 S. W. 401; State ex reL iken v. Buckner (1918) 203
S. W. 242 (Mo. App.); State ex rel. Bruening Realty Co. v. Thomas (1919) 278 Mo. 85,
211 S. W. 667; State ex rel. Caldwell v. Cockrell (1919) 280 Mo. 269, 217 S. W. 524;
State ex rel. Norbourne Land, etc., Co. v. Hughes (1922) 240 S. W. 802 (Mo.); State
ex rel. Coonley v. Hall (1922) 246 S. W. 35 (Mo.).
167. Lenox v. Morris (1843) 8 Mo. 253.
168. State ex rel. Coonley v. Hall (1922) (Mo.) 240 S. W. 35.
169. (1843) 8 Mo. 253.
170. (1912) 246 Mo. 541,151 S. W. 716.
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"These propositions being conceded, it follows that the circuit court,
being possessed of the cause on appeal from the municipal court, was
clothed with judicial power to determine the question whether the parties in interest were legally before the court in the manner prescribed by
the charter, as well as any other question arising in the course of the
trial. Such questions did not strike at the jurisdiction of the court, but
at the regularity and validity of the proceedings up to that stage, and
when the respondent decided or was about to decide adversely to the
contention of the relators, he was acting neither without jurisdiction nor
in excess of jurisdiction, but deciding such issues as arose in a cause
rightfully before him and which that court alone was clothed with authority to decide. It is well settled law that so long as a court is proceeding
within the sphere of its judicial authority, it is not amenable to the writ
of prohibition."
The rule was thus stated by Gantt, J., in State ex rel. Johnson v.
17
IJ/ithrow: 1
"The object of this proceeding is to correct what the relator' deem
was an error in the circuit court in not sustaining their plea to its jurisdiction. As before said, these pleas in no sense challenged the power of
the court over this class of cases, nor urged any inherent disability in
the organization of the court itself, territorially, or in its grant of powers;
but the matters alleged were those of extraneous character which might,
or might not, affect the jurisdiction of the court. For example, in the
absence of this plea, no lawyer would question the power of the circuit
court to hear and determine an action on an administrator's bond. Then,
this plea is one that court must hear and determine before it can decide
whether it should take cognizance of the case, and it is this very right to
hear, determine and decide, whether rightfully or wrongfully, that we denominate jurisdiction."
17 2
Perhaps the relatively recent cases of State ex rel. liken v. Buckner
decided by a court of appeals, and State ex rel. Buckner v. Ellisonl73 ,
decided by the Missouri Supreme Court on certiorari, illustrate about as
well as any opinions found the distinction between error only and excess
or want of jurisdiction. In those cases the facts were as follows: Prohibition was issued to a circuit court by a court of appeals preventing the
circuitjudge from correcting ajudgment nunc pro tunc.
The judgment entered showed that in a certain civil suit the plaintiff first dismissed as to one defendant and the court directed a verdict
as to another defendant. The judge's minutes first mentioned that the
171.
172.
173.

(1891) 108 Mo. 1, 18 S. W. 41.
(1918) (Mo. App.) 203 S. W. 242.
(1918) 277 Mo. 294, 210 S. W. 401.

LAW SERIES

32,

MISSOURI BULLETIN

court had directed a verdict as to one defendant and then mentioned
that plaintiff had dismissed as to one defendant. Except as the order of
mentioning, which action was first taken, the minutes furnished no light
on which action was taken first. The defendant in whose favor the verdict was directed, after it had been reversed on appeal, filed a motion to
modify the judgment nunc pro tunc so as to make it read that plaintiff dismissed as to one defendant after the court had directed a verdict
for the other defendant. Plaintiff then applied to a court of appeals for
a writ of prohibition. It was held that the minutes did not authorize the
trial court to amend the judgment and he should therefore be stopped
by writ of prohibition.
Thereafter the Supreme Court of Missouri issued its writ of certiorari to the court of appeals and quashed the judgment rendered by
the latter court. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals did
not follow controlling Supreme Court decisions in issuing its writ of prohibition, that the trial court was not exceeding its powers in correcting
its own record, that it had power to decide from its minutes whether the
judgment should be corrected and that an incorrect decision would be
error only. Williams, J., writing the opinion for the court en banc disposed of the question as follows:
"The question of the sufficiency of the evidence presented upon the
hearing before the circuit court was, however, not properly before the
appellate court for discussion. Upon its proceeding by writ of prohibition it was concerned merely with the question of whether or not the
circuit court had jurisdiction to hear and determine ,in the first instance,
the matter then pending before it. The question of the sufficiency of the
written evidence to support the requested order nunc pro tune was not a
jurisdictional question in the proper sense, but a question which would
involve nothing more than the interpretation and application of a strict
rule of evidence, applicable to hearings upon motions for orders nunc pro
tunc.
"That the sufficiency or insufficiency of the minutes, in a judge's
docket, to justify the court in correcting its record by an order nunc pro
tunc, is a question of evidence rather than one of jurisdiction, is we think
clearly apparent from the language employed in previous rulings of this
court.'"'14
174.

See also Wandv. Ryan (1902) 166 Mo. 646,65S. W. 1025 accord. Gantt, J.,

writing the opinion, said: (1. c. 648-9) "The return of Judge Ryan and, plaintiff's
motion for judgment notwithstanding, present the questions for our consideration.
If the facts stated in the return show the circuit court had jurisdiction of the class of
cases in which it was proceeding and has not exceeded that jurisdiction, even though
it might have committed some reversible error, then prohibition should not be award-

ed."
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In an early case175 it was held that a court of common pleas errone-

ously issued prohibition to a mayor's court stopping the latter court
from enforcing a fine of $5.00 imposed against one for buying food in

the town elsewhere than in the market place. The ordinance prohibited
the buying of food outside the market but excepted certain things in-

cluding "wild game." The Supreme Court held the mayor's court had
power to decide whether fish were wild game and an incorrect decision
would be error only. This decision may be said to be rather liberal in
that it held power existed in the mayor's court to interpret the ordinance.1 6 No doubt there is a tendency in the cases, following the English cases, where the writ was issued by the temporal courts to the
spiritual courts, to hold that as to courts of limited statutory powers that
they do not acquire jurisdiction unless they correctly determine the
statute law. 7
175. Werthheimerv. Mayer, etal. (1860) 29 Mo. 254.
176. Scott, J., writing the opinion in the above case said: "It is hard to conceive how the question of jurisdiction can be made to depend on the fact whether
the judgment was right or wrong. The mayor unquestionably had authority to
decide whether the ordinance had been violated, and after he has determined it, how
can it be said he had no jurisdiction? According to the argument, the court had to
decide the case before its jurisdiction could be ascertained. If it was of opinion in
favor of the plaintiff, it had jurisdiction; if of the opinion against him, it had none.
In the multiplied number of courts of limited jurisdiction in the English system of
jurisprudence, whose powers are regulated by custom and prescription, instances may
possibly be found which would warrant the application of the refinement indulged in
by the plaintiff in the case before us; but none can be found, where the superintending
court has interfered, where there was a clear intimation of an act of parliament that
the judgment of the inferior should be final."
177. The holdings of the English cases were thus stated by Holmes, J.,in
Thomas v. Mead (1865) 36 Mo. 232: "In general, the authorities seem to show that,
in order to justify a prohibition on the sole ground of misconstruction of statutes, the
statute must be pleaded, or the fact stated in such a manner as to bring the statute
directly in question, and it must distinctly appear that the court below is proceeding
upon such misconstruction. It is unnecessary for the decision of this case that we
should determine this point here; but if it did sufficiently appear, a prohibition would
go on that ground also. It belongs peculiarly to the Supreme Court to put a final
construction upon the Constitution and the statute laws of the State, and indeed
upon the common law also recognized in this State. In like manner, the superior
courts of law in England assumed the determination of the construction of the act
of Parliament; and they prohibit all inferior courts from proceeding upon any construction different from that which is put upon them by superior courts. If an inferior
court misinterprets a statute that is held to be a proceeding contrary to the statute;
and when courts of peculiar jurisdiction, as the Ecclesiastical or Admiralty courts,
which proceed in general according to the civil law, bring in question the statutes or
common law of the realm, they are required to interpret, construe, and expound them,
as they are expounded by the superior courts of common law, or as those courts shall
say they ought to be expounded, when brought before them in prohibition. (Home v.
Carnden, 2 H. BI. 533). For the law is not to be interpreted and decided in two different ways under the same government. If this were to be allowed, or if there were no
power in the Supreme Court to interfere by prohibition in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, and that superintending control, which is given by the Constitution, the
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In an early case,' 78 which has previously been considered, (137f)prohibition was denied when asked for to stop a circuit court from proceeding further in a mandamus proceeding against a county court. It was
held that mandamus should not have been issued but that since the circuit court had jurisdiction of the parties, and the power generally to
issue writs of mandamus to county courts, prohibition should not issue,
as there was error only on the part of the circuit court in issuing the writ
of mandamus.
Prohibition was denied to prevent a circuit court from carrying out
an order disbarring an attorney where one of the grounds for the writ

was that the disbarment proceedings should have been begun in the
name of the state rather than by M and others, members of the St.
Louis Bar Association."'s It was held, at most, there was error in the
proceedings not proper to be reached by prohibition. So, the writ was

denied by the Supreme Court of Missouri when applied for to stop a circuit court from proceeding to judgment in a condemnation case brought
by one railroad company against another to compel the latter company
to permit the former to use its tracks. 8 ' The decision was based upon

the proposition that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties, and an incorrect ruling was not an act in excess of its jurisinferior courts might be brought into unseemly conflicts with one another or with this
court, and we might have to witness the disorderly and disgraceful spectacle of the
officers of different courts, armed with contradictory process, meeting in direct
collision in the public streets, and inaugurating riot and civil disturbance, while
purporting to be acting in the name of one and the same executive authority. Certainly such things can never be permitted in any well ordered government. It was
held in Gould v. Gapper (5 East 345), in an elaborate decision by Lord Ellenbrough,
that the court of King's Bench would prohibit the spiritual courts, or any inferior
court, from proceeding upon a construction of an act of Parliament different from
that which was put upon it by that court, notwithstanding there was a remedy by
appeal or writ of error; not that the inferior court might not have jurisdiction to
construe it, but 'that the mischiefs of misconstruction were to be prevented by prohibition' and there can be little doubt that this court has like power and jurisdiction
in similar cases."
178. Wilson v. Bertstresser (1870) 45 Mo. 283. As previously stated in the
paragraph "(n)", "Other Extraordinary Writs," this opinion seems contrary to the
other Missouri cases, where a narrower view seems to prevail, viz., that the improper
issuance by a lower court of an extraordinary writ is not mere error but that it is
beyond the court's jurisdiction.
179. Bowman's Case (1877) 67 Mo. 146.
180. State ex rel. Union Depot etc. Co. v.Southern Ry. Co. (1889) 100 Mo. 59, 13
S. W. 398. Barclay, J., writing the opinion, said: "Whether the particular facts on
which the court proceeds in that regard are, or are not, sufficient to justify its exercise
of jurisdiction, is a question of law, the solution of which either way cannot impair
the court's right to apply its judicial power in the premises according to its view of the
law and of the facts before it."
It may be added that the opinion also stated that appeal or writ of error was
deemed adequate by the court. Further, it was not held that the trial court had
committed error.
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diction. The writ was also denied where the petition for it was based
upon the ground that defendant had filed an answer alleging that there
was another suit pending between the same parties for the same thing, 81
and the trial court had denied the plea. It was held this defense was one
the trial court had full power to pass upon. The improper appointment
by a circuit court of a referee without first giving the litigants the privilege, as the statute provided, of agreeing upon one was held error and
not an act in excess of its jurisdiction, and hence not to be reached by
prohibition.182
So prohibition will not lie to prevent a justice of the peace court
from entertaining jurisdiction of suits on accounts where the claim is
that the account is a single account much larger than the maximum of
the jurisdiction of the court and that it has been split into three parts
and three suits brought." 3 It was held that if a creditbr splits an account,
recovery on a part of it bars further action or actions for the balance. It
would seem true that usually whether the proper parties are joined in
civil actions does not go to the jurisdiction of the court and that improper rulings as to misjoinder and non-joinder are error only.84 So,
prohibition will not issue to prevent a trial court from proceeding further with an application for change of venue where a change can be taken,
181. State ex rel. Johnson v. Withrow (1891) 108 Mo. 1, 18 S. W. 41. Gantt, P. J.,
writing the opinion, said: "As before said, these pleas in no sense challenged the
power of the court over this class of cases, nor urged any inherent disability in the
organization of the court itself, territorially, or in its grant of powers; but the matters
alleged were those of extraneous character which might, or might not, affect the
jurisdiction of the court. For example, in the absence of this plea, no lawyer would
question the power of the circuit court to hear and determine an action on an administrator's bond. Then, this plea is one that court must hear and determine before it can
decide whether it should take cognizance of the case, and it is this very right to hear,
determine and decide, whether rightfully or wrongfully, that we denominate jurisdiction."
But see "5. (e) Where Jurisdiction of The Case Has Previously Been Assumed
by Another Court in The Judicial System," supra.
182. State ex rel. Webster v. Johnson (1896) 132 Mo. 105, 33 S. W. 781. Gantt,
P. J., said: "But does it follow that the writ of prohibition should issue notwithstanding that error? The court possessed the power to appoint the referee. The conditions
precedent to the appointment after the court determined the necessity, were simply
steps of procedure, however salutary and conducive to the rights of the parties,
and the failure to observe the forms prescribed by the statutes are at most only irreggularities.or errors which the parties may waive."
The opinion then pointed out that there was no exception taken to the erroneous
appointment of the referee and for that reason "the action of the court must stand."
183. Shaw v. Pollord (1900) 84 Mo. App. 286. The opinion is also based upon
the proposition that an appeal to the circuit court where there is a trial de novo is
adequate.
184. Eckerle v. Wood (1902) 95 Mo. App. 378, 69 S. W. 45; State ex rel. Sale v.
MeElhinney (1906) 199 Mo. 67,97 S. W. 159.
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and the only question is as to the correctness of the application for the
change.'85
The writ was denied to prevent a circuit court from proceeding further in an equity case brought by several employees of a city to restrain
a civil service board from wrongfully dismissing them, where they contended they could not be summarily dismissed because of the provision
of a valid city ordinance and the board claimed the ordinance had been
repealed. 88 It was held the circuit court had full power to determine
whether the ordinance was in effect and its meaning. The writ was denied where it was asked for to stop a police court from entertaining
jurisdiction of some two hundred cases filed against relator for violating
an ordinance against placing objects in the city streets.'8 7 The relator
claimed the ordinance did not cover acts done by it, viz., running trains,
but, applied to placing objects at rest in the streets. It was held the
police court had power to determine the meaning of the ordinance. So,
the writ was denied when prayed for to stop a circuit court from proceeding further in an election contest where it was asserted the contestant had not filed a, proper statement of his election expenses as it was
sworn to before an Indiana notary public, etc. 8 8 Whether the statement
was in the proper form was held a matter for the determination of the
trial court and an incorrect ruling would be error only. The manner and
form of making record entries of the proceedings of a circuit court was
held to be within the power of the court in the first instance and hence
not to be reached by prohibition. 88 So, the merits and sufficiency of a
185. State ex rel. Kochtitzky (1907) 203 Mo. 175, 101 S. W. 567.
186. State ex reL Kansas City v. Lucas (1911) 236 Mo. 18, 139 S. W. 348.
Valliant, C. J., writing the opinion, said: "The proposition that a court of equity has
no jurisdiction to deprive the relators of their power to remove the plaintiffs from
their positions in many manner and for any cause is based on the assumption that the
defendants have that authority. Of course if they have such authority a court of
equity cannot deprive them of it; but if they have it not, yet assume it and attempt
to exercise it to the injury of the plaintiffs, a court of equity, may forbid them doing
so. This court cannot assume that the relators have, or that they have not, the power
claimed; the trial court must try that issue, and if it finds that the relators have that
power it will dismiss the plaintiff's bill, but if it should find that they have not that
power lawfully, it will forbid them attempting to exercise it. If the trial court should
err in its conclusions on this question the relators have an adequate remedy by
appeal."
187. State ex rel. Terminal Ry Co. v. Tracy (1911) 237 Mo. 109, 140 S. W. 888.
188. State ex rel. Hagerman v. Taylor (1906) 193 Mo. 654, 91 S. W. 917.
189. State ex rel. Caldwell v. Cockrell (1919) 280 Mo. 269, 217 S. W. 524. Goode,
J., writing the opinion, said (I. c. 289-290): "It sometimes happens that courts,
through mistakes of judgment, give decisions contrary to statutes, but if it has ever
happened that a writ issued to prevent the mistake, we do not know that case."
The question arose in a contempt proceeding against the clerk who refused to
carry out the judge's orders as to the record entries. It was held that the judge had
power to compel the clerk to make the entries, though erroneous, and the clerk was in
contempt for not obeying the judge's orders.
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bill in equity will not be decided by prohibition when the parties are in
court and the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action."
So, the writ was denied when prayed for to stop a circuit court from
carrying out the mandate of a court of appeals where it was held that
the question decided by the court of appeals, viz., the sufficiency of an
order of publication, was within its jurisdiction and not decided contrary
to a controlling supreme court decision."' The writ has been denied. in
condemnatjon proceedings where its real object was to reach errors in
law which it was claimed a trial court was about to commit.1 9 2 So, the

writ was denied to prevent a justice of the peace court from proceeding
further in a misdemeanor case where the writ was applied for on the
ground that the act of the defendant, in the prosecution in the justice
court, was legal, as he was a member of the police force of the City of
St. Louis, acting under legal orders of the Governor of the State of
Missouri. ' It was held that the Governor had no authority over the
190. State ex rel. Warde v. McIuillan (1914) 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72. Lamm,
C. J., said (I. c. 270): "The questions learnedly discuss'ed by counsel pro and con
not only on the merits but on the sufficiency of the bill were all for disposition
below in the first instance, and not for disposition here by a side stroke on prohibition.
We have purposely avoided discussing them, so that we may not put the trial chancellor in leading strings when on some interlocutory step or on final hearing when all
the facts are in, he comes to decide this or that one of them."
191. State ex rel. Coonley v. Hall (1922) (Mo.) 246 S. W. 35. Elder, J., writing
the opinion, said: "From the view we take of this proceeding there is a primary
question before us which is decisive of the case and that is-did the Kansas City
Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to decide the questions involved in the appeal
taken from the order overruling the motion to vacate the judgment of divorce and
re-instate the cause? If so, then upon a proceeding by prohibition we are bound by the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, whether correct or not, and the writ will not lie. If
not, then we can exercise the superintending control lodged in this court by the
Constitution and intervene."
192. State ex rel. Bruening Realty Co. v. Thomas (1919) 278 Mo. 85, 211 S. W.
667; State ex rel. Graham v. Seehorn (1912) 246 Mo. 541, 151 S. W. 716. In the latter
case the contention was that certain ordinances authorizing the proceedings were not
passed in conformity with the requirements of the city charter. Kennish, J., writing
the opinion, said as to this contention (I. c. 558-9): "These propositions being conceded, it follows that the circuit court, being possessed of the cause on appeal from
the municipal court, was clothed with judicial power to determine the validity of
the ordinance or ordinances upon which the condemnation proceedings rested; to
determine the question whether the parties in interest were legally before the court
in the manner prescribed by the charter, as well as any other question arising in the
course of the trial. Such questions did not strike at the jurisdiction of the court,
but at the regularity and validity of the proceedings up to that stage, and when the
respondent decided or was about to decide adversely to the contention of the relators,
he was acting neither without jurisdiction nor in excess of jurisdiction, but deciding
such issues as arose in a cause rightfully before him and which that court alone was
clothed with authority to decide. It is well-settled law that so long as a court is pro
ceeding within the sphere of its judicial authority, it is not amenable to the writ of
prohibition."
193. State ex rel. Mc Namee v. Stobie (1906) 194 Mo. 14,91 S. W. 917.
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city police and that the steps required by law had been taken to give
the justice jurisdiction.
It has also been held that prohibition would not issue to prevent a
circuit court from trying one for gambling where it was claimed by the
prisoner that he had previously been put in jeopardy 94 It was held
whether the prisoner had been in jeopardy was for the trial court's decision in the first instance. The writ was denied by a court of appeals
where it was applied for to prevent a circuit court from entertaining
jurisdiction of an appeal from a justice of the peace court, the claim being that notice of appeal was insufficient. 95 It was held that the circuit
court had power to determine the sufficiency of the notice of appeal.
10
PROHIBITION WILL NOT ISSUE WHERE APPEAL OR
WRIT OF ERROR IS ADEQ UATE
Want of jurisdiction, or a ruling or order of a court in excess of its
jurisdiction, may be corrected by appeal or writ of error in many instances in our judicial system. It is not the purpose of this article to
consider the question when appeal or error lies and what court or courts
have appellate jurisdiction over other courts. It is sufficient for the present purposes to point out that want of jurisdiction, or excess of jurisdiction, may be, and often is, corrected by the usual methods of appeal,
or, writ of error. Evidently superior courts of this state frequently have
been urged, by petitioners for prohibition, to hold that in any case where
there is want or excess of jurisdiction prohibition will issue. Our courts,
however, properly, have not been persuaded to adopt this point of view.
On the contrary the cases hold with consistency that where appeal or
writ of error exist and furnishes an adequate remedy for the litigant
they must be employed though there is want or excess of jurisdiction in
194. State ex rel. Meador v. Williams (1906) 117 Mo. App. 564, 92 S. W. 151.
Goode, J., writing the opinion, said: "But the principle that prohibition only lies to
restrain action by a court beyond its jurisdiction, has always been recognized as
sound. The former jeopardy of these relators is a good plea in bar to the further
prosecution of the case against them; and indeed, as said, they were entitled to their
discharge on the motion filed. If a new conviction ensues, they have a remedy by appeal or writ of error; though doubtless they might be subjected to some injustice be-

fore their case could be heard by a court of last resort. But that result is incident to
every erroneous judgment. The rule is that the remedy for error in overruling a plea
of former adjudication is by appeal and not by prohibition. (State ex rel. v. Withrow,

108 Mo. 1; State ex tel. v. Lubke, 29 Mo. App. 555.)"
195. State ex rel. Kiersey v. Calvird (1917) 195 Mo. App. 354, 191 S. W. 1079.
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the lower court." 6 What constitutes adequacy of remedy seems in most
cases to be a practical question. It is not ordinarily a question of the
kind of judgment that may be given on appeal or writ of error or in prohibition, but largely a question of the necessity of stopping at once all
further action or not stopping it immediately but waiting until an upper
court reaches the case in due course of time. And it may be said that
mere delay in reaching the case that may result after an appeal is taken,
or writ of error has been granted, though it is inconvenient and undesirable, will not warrant the issuance of a writ of prohibition." 7 Perhaps

an example or two of this question of adequacy of the usual methods of
review may serve to make clearer what has been stated abstractly. One
was prosecuted in a city police court for an alleged violation of an
ordinance prohibiting smoke stacks less than fifty feet in height. It was
contended that the ordinance was invalid because unreasonable, in a
petition for prohibition filed in a circuit court. The St. Louis Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, denying the writ,
holding that though the ordinance might be void, there was no reason
shown why the appeal that existed from the police court to the circuit
court was not adequate. 9 '
196. Bowman's Case (1877) 67 Mo. 146; State ex rel. Brainardv.Thayer (1883)
80 Mo. 436;Mastin v. Sloan (1889) 98 Mo. 252, 11 S. W. 558; Shaw v.Pollard (1900)
84 Mo. App. 286; State ex rel. Daugherty v. Hickman (1900) 85 Mo. App. 198; Chicago,
etc. Ry. Co. v. Woodson (1905) 110 Mo. App. 208, 85 S.W. 105; State ex rel. Hainsworth v.Shannon (1908) 130 Mo. App. 90, 108 S. W. 1097; State ex rel. Connors v. Shelton
(1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417; State ex rel. Elam v. Henson (1919) 217 S.W. 11.
197. State ex rel. Connors v. Shelton (1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417. In this
case Lamm, J., writing the opinion for the court en banc, thus stated the rule: "So,
in our Bill of Rights it is ordained that courts ofjustice shall be open to every person,
that certain remedy shall be afforded, etc., 'and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay'. (Art. 2, sec. 10, Const.) But none of those
generalities are sufficient legal grounds for the extraordinary writ of prohibition. If
mere delay, or mere inadequacy or remedy arising from mere delay, could be made the
sole basis for writs of prohibition, then a new and anxious situation would spring;
for thereby a litigant would be invited to leave the beaten way, to discard relief by
appeal, certiorarior error, and seek prohibition as an end-all and cure-all. We could
not very well announce a doctrine of that sort. Certainly the doctrine of the books
does not run that way; nor has this court ever so held. In jurisprudence the maxim is:
We must have recourse to the extraordinary, when what is ordinary fails. (Recurrendum est ad., etc.) Delay, inadequacy of remedy and hardships springing from the
use of other remedies, when present, fill a subsidiary office in prohibition. But mark,
their office is not to furnish a ground for the writ. It is merely to persuade the court to
exercise its discretion to issue one in a case where grounds exist, but where peradventure our discretion might incline us to decline the writ because of the existence of
some ordinary remedy."
198. State ex rel. Hainsworth v. Shannon (1908) 130 Mo. App. 90, 108 S. W.
1097. Goode, J., writing the opinion, said: "And again it has been said that prohibition will not be granted where the usual modes of review will furnish an adequate
remedy, but only when these modes are inadequate to the situation. (St. Louis,
Kennett & So. R. R. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S.W. 357, 658.)"
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In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri one M was a
surety on an injunction bond given by one N in a suit by him in the circuit court, as administrator, against one J. The injunction was dissolved
and J filed the usual motion to assess damages on the bond. During the
proceedings the circuit court make an order substituting B as administrator instead of N. M contending such an order was beyond the power
of the circuit court, applied for a writ of prohibition. The writ was denied on the ground that there were no features of the case which made
appeal inadequate.'
11

PROHIBITION WILL ISSUE, .4 PROPER CASE BEING
PRESENTED, WHERE APPEAL OR WRIT
OF ERROR IS INADEQU.4TE
As stated in the preceding sub-division of this article, want or excess
of jurisdiction, by an inferior court, may ordinarily be reached by appeal or writ of error. 00 It often is the case that though this type of judicial mistake can be thus reached, to require the litigant to employ the
usual methods of reaching it, as a practical matter, will work unusual
hardship. So, it seems well settled that though appeal or writ of error
lies, if appeal or writ of error is not adequate and all the elements are
present which justify prohibition, this writ will not be withheld."'
The writ was issued, though appeal was available, where a circuit court had issued an alternative writ of mandamus ordering a probate judge to show cause why an administratrix of a decedent's estate
should not be permitted to appeal without bond to the circuit court from
an adverse decision against her on a large claim she, personally, had
filed against the estate. It was said that appeal from the order of the
circuit court was not adequate as the relator in the prohibition proceeding had for years been prevented from collecting a just claim against the
199. Mastin r. Sloan (1889) 98 Mo. 252, 11 S. W. 558. The opinion written by
Barclay, J., states the rule as follows: "Any error that court may make in determining the proper limits of its jurisdiction in the premises can be effectively corrected
by any of the usual modes of reviewing judgment. The writ of prohibition should
issue only in circumstances where the ordinary remedies are inadequate to the ends
ofjustice. Where, as here, an appeal or writ of error furnishes a complete and effective
remedy for any error of the court below, prejudicial to the rights of a party, this
extraordinary remedy should be denied."
200. Mastinv. Sloan (1889) 98 Mo. 252, 11 S. W. 558.
201. State ex rel. Kansas City, etc. v. Allen (1891) 415 Mo. App. 551; State ex rel.
Ellis v. Elkin (1895) 130 Mo. 90, 30 S. W. 333, 31 S. W. 1037; Carter, Petitioner o.
Bolster (1906) 122 Mo. App. 135, 98 S. W. 105; State ex rel. v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo.
466, 54 S. W. 494; State ex rel. v. Eby (1902) 170 Mo. 497, 71 S. W. 52; State ex rel.
Knisely v. Jones (1918) 274 Mo. 374, 202 S. W. 1117; State ex rel. Caron v. Deering
(1921) 291 Mo. 169, 236 S. W. 629; State ex rel. Tune v. Falkenhainer(1921) 288 Mo.
20, 231 S. W. 257.
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estate and had been compelled twice before to petition the supreme
court for extraordinary legal remedies.
So appeal was held inadequate where a suit for possession of a
theatre building was begun before a justice of the peace. The petition
filed in the justice court alleged that over $400.00 rent was due, though
no money judgment was asked. The justice awarded a jury trial over
the protest of plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a petition for prohibition in the
Kansas City Court of Appeals. It was held the writ should issue though
an appeal would lie from the justice court to the circuit court where there
existed a trial de novo. It was held appeal was inadequate as it did not
in reality afford plaintiff a summary trial that he was given by express
language of the statute."'
12
MUST THERE BE ANOBJECTIONIN THE LOWER CO URT
BEFORE PROHIBITION WILL ISSUE?
Many cases discuss the question of the necessity for some sort of
objection in the lower court on the ground of no jurisdiction before one
202. State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones (1918) 274 Mo. 374, 202 S.W. 1117. Graves,
C. J., writing the opinion, disposed of the argument that because appeal existed
prohibition would not issue in the following manner:
"Under the peculiar facts of this case we do not think that an appeal or other
remedy would afford relatrix an adequate, prompt and efficient remedy. The facts
pleaded and admitted show the uncalled for dilatory efforts to defeat a judgment
.directed by this court. They further show that the circuit judge is threatening to
compel the probate court do to an act in the very face of an express statute, for to
compel the granting of an appeal to Mrs. Leathe, under the admitted facts, would be
in direct violation of an express statute.
"To compel an appeal, and thus keep open the Knisely estate for two or three
years longer in view of the time elapsed, since this court directed the judgment in
Knisely v. Leathe, and in view of the further fact that the granting of appeal to
Mrs. Leathe (by the writ of mandamus, which our writ is sought to prohibit) would
be to compel the probate court not only to violate the statutes of the State, but to
set aside its discretionary judgment theretofore entered, would not bean adequate
remedy. Our discretionary writ of prohibition should be measured by the circumstance of the case, and when so measured and a wise discretion exercised, we think
the permanent writ should go."
The rule is well stated in State ex rel. v. Eby (1902) 170 Mo. 1.c. 526, 71 S. W.
52, by Sherwood, J.: "It has, however, been urged by counsel for respondent that
inasmuch as relators have a remedy by appeal, etc., in consequence of this, prohibition
cannot be granted. But this is an erroneous view, because in a case like this, where
relators, if they could not have the relief prayed, would be compelled to go to trial
in twelve hundred and three cases; then, if defeated, would have to give bond in each
case, take an appeal in each case, pay for a transcript in each case, pay a docket fee in
each case of ten dollars, such fees amounting in the aggregate to twelve thousand and
thirty dollars, as well as counsel fees in each court, consequently, it must be conspicuously obvious that such appeals, although available, would be 'inadequate to meet
the emergencies of the case, or afford the redress to which the injured party is entitled.
(2 Spelling Inj. and Extr. Rem. (2 Ed.), sec. 1725, and cas. cit.)"
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may apply to a higher court for a writ of prohibition." 3 It can no longer
be laid down as an inflexible rule that in all cases an objection below is
a condition precedent to an application for prohibition.2 4 The more

flexible rule provides that whether the objection below should first have
been made is a matter for the sound discretion of the superior court.
Certainly this is the rule in those cases where the want of jurisdiction
is apparent upon the face of the record." 5
Some of the cases seem to hold that if there is no objection below
and the error is not apparent upon the face of the record that the writ

will be denied solely because there was no objection below. 2 6 Whether
203. State ex rel. Kansas City etc. v. Allen (1891) 45 Mo. App. 551. In this
opinion, written by Ellison, J., the following observations were made: "While it is
true that special provision is made in the landlord and tenant act for an appeal, the
trial on such an appeal is a trial de novo, and affords no redress of the wrong done
relator. It is true that he may obtain, ultimately, the object of his suit, but if he has
a right to have his cause tried by the justice and the justice determines not to try the
cause himself but, instead, to submit it to a jury, relator is quite effectively deprived
of such right, and so completely is he deprived that he cannot have the wrong thus
committed redressed; for in no event can the result of the appeal restore him to the
right to his summary remedy at the hands of the justice of the peace. The law gives the
landlord a quick remedy, and if, in its wisdom, it has declared that such remedy shall
be had by trial before a justice, and not a jury, and this is denied, an appeal does
not obtain it, and the redress must lie ;n the extraordinary process of the courts."
204. State ex reL. Brncic v. Huck (1922) (Mo.) 246 S. W. 303; State ex rel.
Warde v. Mc_uillin (1914) 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72; State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright
(1909) 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057; State ex rel. Mo. Pac. etc. R. R. v. Williams (1909)
221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W. 740; State ex rel. Fenn v. Riley (1907) 127 Mo. App. 469, 105
S. W. 696; State ex rel. Am. Lead Co. v. Dearing (1904) 184 Mo. 647, 84 S. W. 21;
State ex rel. Anheuser etc. Co. v. Eby (1902) 170 Mo. 497, 71 S. W. 52; State ex reL
McCaffery v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494; Forsee v. Gates (1901) 89 Mo.
App. 577; State ex rel. Att'y Gen'l v. Gill (1897) 137 Mo. 681, 39 S. W. 276; State ex reL
The St. Louis Etc. Rd. v. Hirzel (1897) 137 Mo. 435, 38 S. W. 961; State ex rel. v.
Laughlin (1881) 9 Mo. App. 486; Barnes v. Gottschalk (1876) 3 Mo. App. 111.
205. Barnes v. Gottschalk (1876) 3 Mo. App. 111; State ex rel. v. Laughlin (1881)
9 Mo. App. 486. These cases seem to hold that in every case there must be an objection below.
206. State ex rel. v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494; State ex rel. v. Eby
(1902) 170 Mo. 497, 71 S. W. 52; State ex rel. v. Williams (1902) 221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W.
740; State ex rel. v. Bright (1909) 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057.
An excellent statement of this view is to be foun'd in State ex rel. v. Eby (1902)
170 Mo. 1. c. 518, 71 S. W. 53. Sherwood, J., writing the opinion states the rule thus:
"But this is not the law ifit is to be taken as invariably true; true without variation or
shadow of turning. In fact there are so many exceptions to the hackneyed rule, that
the doctrine it announces is now received with many degrees of allowance, and, as
will presently appear, is not an absolute -touchstone of jurisdiction. In short, the
fact of having pleaded lack of jurisdiction in the lower court is not by any means a
sine qua non of jurisdiction in the supervising court to issue the provisional rule.'"
The rule is stated thus by Graves, J., in State ex rel. v. Bright (1909) 224 Mo.
1. c. 525-6, 123 S. W. 1060: "Considering both instruments, one of the points made is,
that the relator's petition here fails to aver, and therefore the admitted facts fail
to show, that relators, then respondents, in the circuit court of Jasper County made
objection to the jurisdiction of that court prior to the application for a writ of pro-
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the writ will ever be granted where there is no objection below and the
want of jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record, seems
not clear.2"' It would seem that in nearly every case, where the want of
jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record, that objection
to the jurisdiction of the lower court proceeding should first be made."'
Perhaps cases may arise where the objection need not be made below
and the want of jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the record.20sa

13
PLEADING IN

PROHIBITION

The initial pleading is a petition, or written suggestion, for the writ
filed in the superior court that is authorized to issue the writ to the inferior court." 9
hibition here. It has never been a hard and fast rule in this State that the jurisdiction
of the lower court must first be challenged therein before a provisional writ can issue
from this court."
In State ex rel. v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 1. c. 478, 54 S. W. 494, the rule is thus stated
by Valliant, J.: "The real and only purpose of the suit in the circuit court was to bar
the entrance to the office of board of election commissioners by injunction, and to
obtain a decree of a chancery court declaring relators' title to the office invalid. That
is a subject over which a chancery court has no jurisdiction. The courts of law are
open to all persons who have rights of that nature which have been violated, and
ample means are afforded to those courts for the vindication of such rights and the
redress of their wrongs. (High on Inj., sec. 312; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Hunter v.
Chandler, 45 Mo. 452; State ex rel. v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97; State ex rel. v. May, 106 Mo.
488.)"
207. State ex rel. Brncic v. Huck (1922) 246 S. W. 303. There the rule is thus
stated by Higbee, J.: "The general rle is that an application for a writ of prohibition
will not be considered unless a plea to the jurisdiction has been filed and overruled in
the lower court, or the inferior court has been asked in some form, without avail, to
refrain from further proceeding or to dismiss the same. 32 Cyc. 624. This was not
done in this case. An exception to this rule is recognized where a want or excess of
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record. State v. Dearing, 184 Mo. 647, 84
S. W. 21. From an examination of the record, it will be seen that this case falls within
the general rule."
State ex rel. v. Gill (1897) 137 Mo. 681, 39 S. W. 276.
208. State ex rel. v. Riley (1907) 127 Mo. App. 469, 105 S. W. 696. Goode, J.,
writing the opinion, said the rule is as follows: "The effect of those, and perhaps of
other recent decisions, is that the refusal to grant prohibition until the lower court
has overruled the plea to its jurisdiction, is rather a discretionary matter of practice in
the supervising court, than a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ; and
hence, where want of jurisdiction is palpable, the failure to raise the question below
does not necessarily hinder the superior court to interfere though it may refrain from
doing so until an appeal is made to the lower court."
208a. 10 Halsbury's Laws of England 147.
209. Sees. 2059-2060 R. S. Mo. 1919. State ex rel. Spickerman v. Fox (1884) 85
Mo. 61.
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The defendant may demur to the petition.21 ° It seems that defendant also may raise the question of the sufficiency of this petition by
motion to quash the writ.2"
If defendant does not demur or move to quash, defendant must file
a return to the preliminary order. 2
Plaintiff should reply to the return or question its sufficiency in law
insome appropriate way.2"' There seems to be several ways by which
the sufficiency in law of the return may be raised. It may be raised by
demurrer to the return 214 which is perhaps the most appropriate way.
The sufficiency, in law, of the return also may be raised by a motion to
quash the return 211 or motion for judgment on the pleadings. 216 The
court may, it seems, "as an act of grace" treat an insufficient reply as a
2 17
demurrer to the return or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
So ex gratia an insufficient return has been treated as a demurer tb the
petitioh for the writ.21 The general rule, however, is that pleadings in
prohibition should raise an issue of law or fact. 219 It is improper to raise

an issue of fact by the pleadings and submit the cause to the court with-

2 20
If
out agreeing upon the facts or having them determined by proof.

210. Sec. 2061 R. S. Mo. 1919. State ex rel. Henson v.Sheppard (1905) 192 Mo.
497. As to the effect of a demurrer, Lamm, J., in the preceding case, said (I. c. 505):
"The controversy, in the shape the pleadings assume, resolves itself into a question of
law, for the demurrer admits every allegation of the petition well pleaded."
211. State ex rel. Powers v. Rassieur (1916) (Mo.) 184S. W. 116. Here Faris, J.,
stated the rule as follows: (1. c. 118): "Both a demurrer to the petition and a motion
to quash the writ are attacks upon the petition, and admit all of the facts therein
which are well pleaded."
212. Sec. 2061 R. S. Mo. 1919. State ex rel. Fenn v. Mc._uillin (1914) 256 Mo.
693, 165 S.W. 713.
213. Sec. 2061 R. S. Mo. 1919. State ex rel. Fenn v. Mc9uillin (1914) 256 Mo.
693, 165 S. W. 713; State ex rel. Connors v.Shelton (1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417.
214. State ex rel. Powers v. Rassieur (1916) (Mo.) 184 S. W. 116; Vitt v. Owens
(1868) 42 Mo. 512.
215. State ex rel. Ellis v. Elkin (1895) 130 Mo. 90, 31 S.W. 1037; State ex rel.
Powers v.Rassieur (1916) 184 S. W. 116.
216. State ex rel. Powers v.Rassieur ('1916) (Mo.) 184 S. W. 116; State ex rel.
American etc. Co. v. Shields (1911) 237 Mo. 329, 141 S. W. 585; Wyandv. Ryan (1901)
166 Mo. 646, 65 S.W. 1025; State ex rel. v. Sheppard (1905) 192 Mo. 497, 91 S.W. 477.
217. State ex rel. v.Shelton (1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417; State ex rel. v.
Guthrie (1912) 245 Mo. 144, 149 S. W. 305.
218. State exrel. Fenn v. Me-Quillin (1914) 256 Mo. 693,165S. W. 713.
219. State ex rel. Fenn v. Mc~uillin (1914) 256 Mo. 693, 165 S.W. 713; State ex
rel. Boyer v. Houck (1914) 260 Mo. 140, 168 S.W. 762; State ex rel. v. Laughlin (1881)
9 Mo. App. 486; State ex rel. Powers v.Rassieur (1916) (Mo.) 184 S. W. 116.
220. State ex rel. v. Rassieur (1916) 184 S. W. 116. In this case Faris, J., made
the following observations: "But here the sole relief asked for, and the sole ground
on which the prayer for relief is bottomed, is that Judge Rassieur was attempting to
put his judgment in force pending a motion for a new trial. Judge Rassieur denies
this specifically. No evidence pro or con is offered; no agreed facts are before us. We
do not know and cannot find out from this record whether Judge Rassieur was or was
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this is not done the preliminary rule will be discharged. Obviously the
manner of pleading prevailin'g in civil actions must be complied with.21
As appears from the cases cited in the footnotes, nearly all the petitions for prohibition are begun in the name of the state at the relation
of some individual or corporation. This is no doubt accounted for because in English law the writ was issued in the name of the crown. 2
The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, has said that the petition or
23
application for the writ should not be in the name of the state.

not doing the acts complained of. So the matter of whether, if Judge Rassieur were
doing the things he is charged with doing, he would have a right or not in law to do
them, becomes a bald moot question. We can render no judgment on such a record."
Stateex rel. v. Houck (1914) 260 Mo. 140, 168 S.W. 762; Sec. 2062, R.S. Mo. 1919.
221. State ex rel. v. Mc~uillin (1914) 256 Mo. 693, 165 S. W. 713; State ex re. U.
Bright (1909) 224 Mo. 514, 135 S. W. 552; State ex rel. v. Guthrie (1912) 245 Mo. 144;
State ex rel. v. Shelton (1911) 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417. In State ex rel. v. Mc9uillin
(1914) 256 Mo. 693, 1. c. 709, 165 S. W. 713, Faris, J., made the following strong and
pertinent statements: "Unless such an exhibit to a petition for prohibition becomes
a part of the petition in the same manner as an exhibit is made an integral part of a
pleading in an ordinary suit, we will not regard it as a part thereof here for the purpose of aider against demurrer. There is no reason why, when we have regard to the
fact that the number of original writs we issue and consider is increasing by leaps and
bounds, we should step aside from the well-known beaten paths of practice to make, in
a prohibition case, an unnecessary exception to the general rule, which exception so
far from expediting business will but impede, dela'y and hinder. If we spend weeks
trying to pick out the issues from a commingled mass of void and formless matter
which has gathered volume as it rolled up to us, we are thereby delaying others, who
by diligence have earned a speedy hearing."
222. High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3rd ed.) 733.
223. State ex rel. v. Hirzel (1897) 137 Mo. 435, 38 S. W. 961. There Barclay, J.,
used the following language (1. c. 449): "The plaintiffs have entitled their suit 'The
State of Missouri at the relation,' etc., as appears at the opening of the report of this
case. We have followed that caption, as no question is raised concerning it. But we
would remind our brethren of the bar that the statute regulating procedure in prohibition contemplates a simple form of action between the actual parties concerned as
plaintiffs and defendants, and applies the general provisions of the code of practice to
such cases as far as it is properly applicable. Laws 1895, p. 95, sec. 3."
See State ex rel. v. Eby (1902) 170 Mo. 497, 1. c. 527, 71 S. W. 52, where it was
held not improper to institute the proceedings for prohibition in the name of the
state, and, also, that the laws of 1895 (now Art. 12, Chap. 13, R. S. Mo. 1.919) are not
applicable to original proceedings in the supreme court. Sherwood, J., for the court,
said: "The final point is insisted on that this proceeding should have been instituted
by relators in their own names, as plaintiffs, and not on the relation of the State of
Missouri, and section 4450, Revised Statutes 1899, is cited in support of this position.
But that section is only applicable in the circuit courts, and not to this court when
original proceedings are instituted here. Proceedings of this sort which originate in
this court, are governed not by the code, but by the general law on the subject.
(lb., sec. 4456; State ex inf. v. Beechner, 160 Mo. loc. cit. 86)."
See section 2059, R. S. Mo. 1919, providing that this remedy "Shall be a civil
action, in which the moving party is plaintiff and the adverse party defendant."
See also Ostmann v. Frey (1910) 148 Mo. App. 271, 128 S. W. 253, for a discussion of
the Act of 1895.
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Ordinarily the petition for the writ is instituted by one who is interested in the litigation sought to be stopped in the lower court. However, the rule in Missouri, following the English common law, is to the
224
effect that anyone, even a stranger, may be a petitioner for the writ.
The only necessary party defendant is the judge of t'he court whose
action is sought to be prevented.2 15 Obviously the return of an individual1 who has been made a party defendant together with2 the judge
will be disregarded if in conflict with the return of the judge. 11

14

PRACTICE IN PROHIBITION
Though the practice in prohibition is not difficult or complicated it
has seemed advisable to point out its salient features.
Upon the filing of a petition, which states facts constituting grounds
for the issuance of prohibition, the court, if it thinks that the writ probably will be granted, issues a preliminary rule in prohibition.Y?
This preliminary writ is a judicial writ issuable only by the judge

224. Trainor, Presiding Justice, etc., v. Porter (1870) 45 Mo. 336; Thomas v.
Mead (1865) 36 Mo. 232. In the latter case, Holmes, J., said: "It is granted at the
instance of any one of the parties to the suit below, plaintiff or defendant, and even by
a stranger (2 Inst. 602; 6 Com. Dig. 105); and because they deal in that which does
not appertain to the jurisdiction of the court. (2 Inst. 607.) Indeed, the authorities
are endless, and place the subject beyond all dispute. (2 Sel. 308; 6 Com. Dig. 105,
140; 6 Bac. Abr. 579, 600; Full v. Hutchins, Cowp. 424; Buggin v. Bennett, 4 Burr.
2035)."
See also State ex rel. v.Calhoun (1920) (Mo. App.) 226 S. W. 329; s. c. 233 S.W.
483; Shortt, Mandamus and Prohibition, 1st Am. Ed. by Heard, 542; 10 Halsbury's
Laws of England 144.
225. State ex rel. Stroh v. Klene (1918) 276 Mo. 206, 207 S. W. 496; State ex rel. v.
Bright (1909) 224 Mo. 514, 135 S. W. 552; State ex rel. v. Rassieur (1916) (Mo.)
184 S. W. 116. In the case last cited, it was said a party litigant where a case is
affected is a "permissible party" defendant.
See State ex rel v. Roach (1911) 234 Mo. 338, 137 S. W. 595 as to joinder of parties
defendant.
226. State ex rel. v. Rassieur (1916) 184 S. W. 116.
227. State ex rel. Macklin v. Rombauer (1891) 104 Mo. 619, 16 S. W. 502;
State ex rel. v. Ryan (1904) 180 Mo. 32, 79 S. W. 429; sec. 2060, R. S. Mo. 1919;
State ex rel. v.Dearing (1904) 184 Mo. 647, 84 S. W. 21. See rule of supreme court 22
(294 Mo. p. 11), requiring applicant, normally, to give five days notice to adverse
party.
This is the prevailing practice. Prohibition, 32 Cyc. 627. High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd Ed. p. 755.

THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION

of the court and not the clerk." 8 It may be issued by a single judge of
a court in vacation where the court consists of several judges. 2 9
It is the duty of the lower court when the preliminary rule is issued
to take no further steps in the pending case. 2 '
In order for a rule in prohibition to issue there must be a pending
case in the lower court or the action sought to be prohibited must be
before such court.22 ' So, the preliminary writ will be quashed where,

228. Casby v. Thompson (1868) 42 Mo. 133. In that case, Holmes, J., said:
"It is beyond all question that the clerk of the Circuit Court in vacation had no
power or authority to issue a writ of prohibition.

It seems to have been supposed

that 'the remedy by writ of injunction or prohibition,' which is spoken of in the act
concerning injunctions (Gen]. Stat. 1865, ch. 167, sec. 24), refers to a prohibition of
this nature. This is evidently a misconception. The word is there used in the general
sense of a restraint by injunction, and not in the technical sense of a writ of prohibi-

tion. The clerk had no more authority to issue an injunction than a prohibition."
229. State ex rel. v. Dearing (1904) 184 Mo. 647, 84 S. W. 21; State ex rel. Macklin v.Rombauer (1891) 104 Mo. 619, 15 S.W. 850, 16 S.W. 502; State ex rel. Rogers v.
Rombauer (1891) 105 Mo. 103, 16 S.W. 695; section 2060, R. S. Mo. 1919.
The following extract is taken from State ex rel. Macklin v. Rombauer (1891) 104
Mo. 619, 1.c. 631" "Bearing in mind the purpose of the writ of prohibition, its history
and the existing condition of the law here, should we suppose that the constitution of
our state designed to limit the scope or diminish the occasions of its usefulness as
recognized in the English law? It would seem not. Yet if it be held that no judge of
the-court during its vacation has authority, according to the 'principles and usages of
law,' to make a rule upon a defendant to show cause in such a case, it would follow as a
necessary consequence that, during the greater part of the year, no step whatever

could be taken toward utilizing this useful writ, however great the urgency for its
interposition."
230. State ex rel. Knisely v. Board etc. (1916) 268 Mo. 163, 186 S. W. 680:
State ex rel. ). Rassieur (1916) 190 S. W. 915.
231. State ex rel. Haughey v. Ryan (1904) 180 Mo. 32, 79 S.W. 429. Here an
application had been filed in the circuit court that relator be cited for contempt. The
citation had neither been issued or served. Holding that the petition for prohibition
was premature, Fox, J.,said: "The question first to be settled in this proceeding is
narrowed lown simply to this: under the facts alleged in the petition, is there a
cause pending before Judge Ryan, of which he has assumed jurisdiction, when,
under the Constitution and laws of the State, he has none? It will be observed, upon
examination of the petition, that it expressly alleges that in this contempt proceeding
no citation has been issued to the relators, and it will be further noted that there is an
absence of any allegation that Judge Ryan will proceed to dispose of the cause unless
he is prohibited from so doing. Before this extraordinary writ will be issued, to prohibit a court of general jurisdiction from disposing of a cause, it should clearly appear
that the court has assumed jurisdiction of it, and will proceed to dispose of it unless
prohibited from doing so. In other words, there must be a cause pending before the
court upon which the writ can operate. The assumption of jurisdiction, in order to
authorize the issuance of the writ sought in this cause, contemplates not only an
assumption of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but also over the person."
assumption over the subject-matter but also over the person."
State ex rel. Rudolph v. Witthoeft (1906) 117 Mo. App. 625, 93 S. W. 284; State
tx rel. Mueller etc. Co. v.Buckner (1921) 207 Mo. App. 48, 229 S.W. 392.
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after it has been issued, the suit below has been dismissed,3 2 though
there remains the question of liability for court costs. When the question
in the pefiding case is a "moot" question the writ will not issue. 3 Nor
will the writ issue when nothing remains to be done in the case in the
lower court. 4 For instance, it wa§ held by the Supreme Court of Missouri that it was too late to issue a writ of prohibition to a court of appeals
where the latter court had decided the case on appeal, overruled a motion
for rehearing and transmitted its mandate to the lower court.3 5 Prohibition is essentially a preventive remedy and not a corrective rem23 6
edy.
t follows from what has been said as to the nature of the writ,
remains unexecuted in
viz., that it is a preventive remedy, if anything
2 37
the pending case that prohibition will issue.
Originally an appeal from an order of a circuit court denying a writ
of prohibition would not lie to any appellate court in the state.238 The
232. State ex rel. Fischer v. Thomas (1913) 249 Mo. 103, 155 S. W. 401. In that
case Lamm, C. J., for the court, said: "We do not sit as a moot court to determine
speculative questions for the benefit of some other case in judgment at some other
time. Mark the actual situation. If we prohibited the circuit court from proceedingcui bono? It has effectually done that: by itself. The receivership suit is dead, and
henceforth is of no use (except to point a moral). If we held the circuit court had
jurisdiction to proceed with that suit-wherefore? It has effectually tied its own
hands and could not lift a finger in proceeding to adjudge the merits. Yet if we proceeded to judgment on the merits we would have to do one or the other of those two
thi.ngs and in either event our judgment would amount to the same thing, viz.,
nothing. Shall a court that is (and has been invited to be) about the serious business of
settling a grave question of jurisdiction, turn aside to emit a mere squeak on costs as
the be-all and end-all of the matter? We do not sit in the comedy of 'Much Ado
About Nothing', if we know it in advance."
See also United States u. Hoffman (1866) 4 Wall. 158.
233. State ex rel. 4shton v. Imel (1912) 243 Mo. 178, 147 S. W. 994; Kalbfell u.
Wood (1906) 193 Mo. 675, 92 S. W. 230.
234. State ex rel. Strother v. Broaddus (1911) 234 Mo. 358, 137 S. W. 268; State
ex rel. Crouse v. Mills (1910) 231 Mo. 493, 133 S.W. 22; Klingelhoefer v. Smith (1903)
171 Mo. 455, 71 S. W. 1008; State ex rel. Morse v. Burckhartt (1895) 87 Mo. 533.
235. State ex rel. Strother v. Broaddus (1911) 234 Mo. 358.
236. The matter is stated as fcllows by Valliant, J., in Klingelhoefer v. Smith
(1903) 171 Mo. 455 (1. c. 462): "That court was not therefore doing or indicating
an intention to do, anything in the matter; the case was no longer in the court. A
writ of prohibition will have the effect to undo what has already been done in a case
where the court against which the writ goes has begun to take action, but has not
finished. But when the court has exh austed its force, rendered itsfinal judgment and
nothing is left undone, there is nothijig to prohibit."
237. State ex rel. Rogers v. Ronbauer (1891) 105 Mo. 103, 16 S. W. 695; State
ex rel. Wilson v, Burney (1915) 193 Mo. App. 326, 186 S. W. 23; State ex rel. Ellis v.
Elkin (1895 130 Mo. 90, 31 S. W. 1(37; St. Louis etc. Rd. Co. v. Wear (1896) 135

Mo. 230, 36S) W. 658.
238. State ex rel. Smith v. Levens (1888) 32 Mo. App. 520; State ex rel. Griffith v.
Bowerman (1890) 40 Mo. App. 576; Kalbfell v. Wood (1906) 193 Mo. 675, 92 S. W.
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writ was a discretionary writ at common law and there was no writ of
error from a refusal to grant the writ and there was no statute in Missouri authorizing an appeal where the writ had been refused. The applicant's only, remedy was to make further application to a higher
court."' By statute passed in 1915 an appeal was granted, it has been
held, from a circuit court to the appropriate appellate court where the
circuit court makes an order refusing to grant the writ.'"' Since the
appeal was given by statute, as above stated, it has been held by a court
of appeals that a judgment of a circuit court denying the writ is res adjudicata and will prevent another application to a higher court.2 4 ' This
decision seems open to question. The statute authorizing an appeal
seems not to provide that the litigant must appeal if he wants the question again considered by a higher court in the judicial system but merely
gives him the privilege of appealing without eliminating the privilege
that he already had of applying to a higher court for the writ. Such a
construction of the statute seems not consistent with the fact that the
supreme court, and courts of appeals, are granted original jurisdiction to
issue prohibition by the constitution and also given superintending control of lower courts.. It might be said that a statute providing that an
appeal must be taken from an order of a circuit court denying the writ,
otherwise the writ shall not issue by a higher court, would amount to a
limitation upon the original jurisdiction of the higher courts conferred

by the constitution, and hence void. No doubt substantial curtailment
of the original jurisdiction of the appellate courts by legislative enactment will not be upheld.
The very earliest decisions in this state established the rule that a
writ of error or appeal will lie from a judgment of a circuit court awarding a final writ of prohibition.'
239. The common-law rule was thus stated by Thompson, J., in State ex reL
Griffith v. Bowerman (1890) 40 Mo. App. 576 (1. c. 577): "It was held by the House
of Lords in the case of the Bishop of St. David's v. Lucy, 1I d. Raym. 545, that a writ
cf error does not lie to the King's Bench to reverse a judgment of that court denying
a writ of prohibition. It was held in Free v. Burgoyne, 5 Barn. & Cres. 765, that a
writ of error in such a case would not lie in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, such a
remedy not having been given by statute. On the contrary, the recognized remedy
in England, where a writ of prohibition is denied, seems always to have been to apply
to another court having power to issue it. In Lindo v. Rodney, 1 Doug. 620, note,
Lord Mansfield said that the relator could in such a case renew his application in
every court in Westminster Hall."
240. Ostmann v. Frey (1910) 148 Mo. App. 271,128 S. W. 253.

241.

Coleman v. Dalton (1897) 71 Mo. App. 14.

242. Morris v. Lenox & Martin (1843) 8 Mo. 253; Wertheimer v. Mayor, et al.
(1860) 29 Mo. 254; Howard v. Pierce (1866) 38 Mo. 296; Prohibition, 32 Cyc. 631;
High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed. 2418.
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Without doubt the judgment awarded in prohibition is negative in
its nature. It commands the inferior court to st6p all action or particular
action in the pending matter. Where an affirmative order is the main
thing sought prohibition is not the appropriate extraordinary legal
remedy. It will only issue, in a proper case, where the object in view is
to prevent further exercise of jurisdictional power not possessed by the
inferior judicia'l tribunal. The judgment is therefore negative. 43 No
attempt is made in a prohibition proceeding to adjudicate the merits of
the controversy except so far as that is necessary to determine the
question of jurisdiction or no jurisdiction. Hence, a judgment stopping
one court from taking further action in a pending suit does not prevent
the litigant from instituting the same suit before another tribunal."
Nice questions sometimes arise as to the scope of the command in the
writ of prohibition. It seems that only those things are prohibited that
2 45
While prohibition
are fairly within the terms of the order orjudgment.
is in its nature negative, it seems true that the court issuing the writ incidental to its negative command may also make necessary affirmative
243. State ex rel. Carter v. Bollinger (1909) 219 Mo. 204, 117 S. W. 1132. In
that case the writ was denied, for one reason, because the purpose of it was to compel
a county court to make certain apportionment of county funds. Woodson, J., for the
court, said: "Conceding the position of counsel for relators in that regard to be
correct, without deciding it, yet it must also be conceded that prohibition is not the
proper remedy by which the judges of the county court could be compelled to perform their duty in that particular. The office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent
action on the part of an officer when he threatens to act outside of or beyond his
jurisdiction, and not for the purpose of compelling action upon his part within his
jurisdiction. The performance of the latter duty is secured by a writ of mandamus.
(State ex relv. Patterson, 207 Mo. 129.)"
Stateexrel.Merriam v. Ross (1896) 136 Mo. 259, 41 S. W. 1041.
244. State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross (1896) 136 Mo. 259, 41 S. W. 1041. This was a
contempt proceeding. Certain persons had been commanded by writ of prohibition to
take no further steps in an action pending in the Cape Girardeau court of common
pleas. Later they commenced an action in the circuit court of Cape Girardeau County
for the same thing. It was held there was no disobedience of the writ and hence no
contempt. Gantt, C. J., said: "The office of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all
action and prevent any further proceeding in the prohibition direction.
"In the principal case all that was sought at the hands of 'this court was to
prohibit the Cape Girardeau court of common pleas from further exercise of the
power it had assumed it possessed, under the act creating it, of hearing and determining the cause, then pending therein, and likewise the several parties to said
proceeding from takingfurther steps in that action.
"It was clearly within the jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine the
question whether said court was in that case exceeding the jurisdiction prescribed for
it by the law of this state, but it would be an unusual exercise of our own jurisdiction
to extend that extraordinary writ, issued for that purpose alone, so as to prohibit
actions in other courts which were not open to criticism either as to their form or the
subject'-matter thereof and clearly wi:hin the jurisdiction of such other courts."
245. State ex rel. Powers v.Rassieur (1916) (Mo.) 190S. W. 915; Prohibition, 32
Cyc. 631.
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orders. 46 The command or judgment issues to the lower court (sometimes the party litigant in the pending case is included) but not to the
24
ministerial officers of the lower court,2 47 or the party litigant only. 8
Citation. and punishment for contempt of court is the usual and
49
approved method of enforcing a writ of prohibition.
Costs of the proceeding are usually taxed against the relator even
though the writ is issued. 5
University of Missouri School of Law

J. P. McBaine

246. State ex rel. Campbell v. St. Louis Court of Appeals (1888) 97 Mo. 276, 10
S. W. 874. In this case the writ was issued by the supreme court to a court of appeals
stopping the latter court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case which was
within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The supreme court also
ordered the cause transferred to the supreme court. State ex rel. Rogers v. Rombauer
(1891) 105 Mo. 103, 16 S. W. 695.
See State ex rel. Bixman v. Denton (1908) 128 Mo. App. 304, 107 S. W. 446, where
a writ of prohibition was sought to stop a court from granting a change of venue. It
was held the court had jurisdiction to award the change of venue and hence the writ
was denied but the court went further and made an affirmative command to the
lower court to grant the change of venue.
247. Ostmann v. Frey (1910) 148 Mo. App. 271, 128 S. W. 253; 10 Halsbury's
Laws of England 153.
248. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd. ed., p. 706; Prohibition, 32
Cyc. 631; Ex Parte Williams (1842) 4 Ark. 537, 38 Am. Dec. 46; St. Louis etc., Ry.
Co. v. Wear (1896) 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 658. See State ex rel. Powers V. Rassieur
(1916) (Mo.) 190 S. W. 915, for a writ where the judge of the circuit court and the
party to the suit below were both commanded not to do certain things; 10 Halsbury's
Laws of England, 153.
249. Howard v. Pierce (1866) 38 Mo. 296; State ex rel. Ellis v. Elkin (1895)
130 Mo. 90, 31 S. W. 1037; State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross (1896) 136 Mo. 259, 41 S. W.
1041; Prohibition, 32 Cyc. 631; High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., 756;
8 Bacon's Abridgment, 244. The rule as stated by the author last cited is as follows:*
"The disobeying of a prohibition is a contempt to the superior court that awards it,
and punishable by attachment, which issues against the judge and party (a) for
proceeding after such prohibition, and for which they are subject to fine and imprisonment, according to the discretion of the superior court."
250. State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Reynolds (1912) 245 Mo. 698, 151 S. W. 85.
There Lamm, J., stated the rule, and the reason for it, as follows: "Let the writ go
-at relator's costs, however. Judges should not be mulcted in costs or other damages
for errors ofjudgment in judicial matters."
State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk (1911) 236 Mo. 201,139 S. W. 199.

